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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1989). The Utah Supreme Court 
is authorized to transfer this case to the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Rule 4(A), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Respondent Valley Bank and Trust Company ("Valley") 
commenced this action to enforce a guaranty executed by appellant 
Wesley Sine ("Sine") whereby Sine guaranteed a promissory note 
executed by Jerry Sine and Dora Sine in favor of Valley. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Does a statement by Valley concerning bidding at a 
trustee's sale for which Sine is not a trustor or a party consti-
tute a defense to Sine's unconditional guarantee of payment? 
II. Is a separate, alleged agreement entered into by 
Valley and Sine to release Sine from his guarantee within the 
statute of frauds so that the agreement must be in writing to be 
enforceable? 
III. May Sine raise for the first time on appeal the 
doctrines of part performance, promissory estoppel and waiver to 
defeat Valley's action? 
IV, Does the doctrine of part performance apply in 
this case so that Valley's alleged statement to release Sine need 
not be in writing? 
V. Does the doctrine of promissory estoppel apply in 
this case to prevent Valley from obtaining a judgment against 
Sine? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Sine appeals from the "Summary Decision" entered by the 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy on March 24, 1989, wherein Judge 
Murphy granted Valley's motion for summary judgment against Sine. 
Course of Proceedings 
On December 12, 1988, Valley filed a complaint to 
enforce a guaranty executed by Sine, in which Sine guaranteed the 
obligations owed by his parents, Jerry Sine and Dora Sine, to 
Valley. (R. 002) Sine filed an answer (R. 009), and Valley 
filed a motion for summary judgment. (R. 012) After briefing 
and oral argument, the Honorable Judge Michael R. Murphy issued a 
Summary Decision, granting summary judgment in favor of Valley. 
(R. 088) On April 10, 1989, the court entered judgment against 
Sine. (R. 095) On the same day, Sine filed an "Objection to 
Order, Motion for a New Trial or to Correct Decision and 
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Memorandum of Authorities." (R. 092) After briefing by the par-
ties and on June 12, 1989, the court entered an order denying 
Sine's Objection to Order and Motion for a New Trial, (R. 124) 
Judgment was again entered against Sine on July 3, 1989. 
(R. 126) Sine filed a Notice of Appeal on August 2, 1989. 
(R. 133) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On July 16, 1986, Jerry Sine and Dora Sine exe-
cuted a Commercial Promissory Note in favor of Valley in the 
principal sum of $317,797.21. (R. 019-020) 
2. On the same date, Sine executed and delivered to 
Valley an unconditional guaranty, guaranteeing the payment and 
performance of Jerry Sine's and Dora Sine's present and future 
obligations to Valley ("Guaranty"). (R. 020) 
3. On July 16, 1987, Jerry Sine and Dora Sine exe-
cuted another Commercial Promissory Note ("Note") in favor of 
Valley in the principal sum of $973,261.20, which sum encompassed 
the unpaid balance due under the July 16, 1986, Commercial Prom-
issory Note. (R. 020) 
4. As security for the Note, Jerry Sine and Dora Sine 
as trustors executed a Trust Deed, dated July 16, 1987, encumber-
ing real property in Salt Lake County, Utah, which is commonly 
known as the Se Rancho Motel ("Motel"). (R. 020) 
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5. Jerry Sine and Dora Sine failed to pay the monthly 
installments due under the Note. (R. 021) 
6. Despite demand upon Sine, Sine failed and refused 
to honor his Guarantee. (R. 021) 
7. The trustee under the Trust Deed recorded a Notice 
of Default of the Trust Deed on December 31, 1987, and provided 
Sine with a copy of the Notice. (R. 021) 
8. On December 18, 1988, Valley filed a complaint 
against Sine in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake' County, seeking the amount then due under the Note in prin-
cipal sum of $981,407.00, together with $197,461.80 in accrued 
but unpaid interest. (R. 002) 
9. As a result of the default of the Note, the 
trustee of the Trust Deed sold the Motel at a public trustee's 
sale on December 29, 1988. (R. 021) 
10. As of the date of sale, the total amount due under 
the Note was in the sum of $1,225,145.00. (R. 035) 
11. Valley bid the sum of $842,704.02 at the trustee's 
sale. (R. 021) 
12. Valley credited the amount due with its bid and 
reduced its claim against Sine to a principal amount of 
$342,441.00. (R. 021) 
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13. Sine was not a party to the Note or the Trust Deed 
given as security for the Note. Sine was a party only to the 
Guarantee. (R. 023, 024, 025, 026) 
14. The affidavit of Wesley Sine filed in opposition 
to Valley's motion for summary judgment states in part as 
follows: 
2. Purpose of the meeting was to dis-
cuss possible extension of a Sheriff's sale 
[sic, it was a non-judicial trustee's sale] 
of the Se Rancho Motel property which was 
scheduled to take place the following day. 
The property is owned by my parents Jerry & 
Dora Sine. I am the General Manager of the 
Se Rancho Motel and manage that property for 
them. 
I was concerned that some party 
other than Valley Bank, would purchase the 
property at the trustee's sale, thereby deny-
ing Jerry and Dora Sine of their previously 
agreed upon redemption rights. 
3. After considerable discussion, Mr. 
Doctorman, in the presence of Mr. Zollinger, 
and with his acquiescence, stated that I need 
not worry that Valley Bank would bid on the 
property at the amount owed on the note plus 
interest, costs and attorneys's fees. 
4. I was asked if I planned to attend 
the sale. Relying upon this assurance from 
Mr. Doctorman and Mr. Zollinger I told them I 
probably would not and did not attend the 
trustee's sale. We then shook hands and Mr. 
Cundick & myself left the meeting. 
(R. 057) 
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15. There is no evidence of an agreement requiring 
Sine to not attend the sale or to refrain from seeking other 
bidders. 
16. There is no evidence that Sine had the financial 
resources to purchase the property himself; that Sine had sought 
other bidders in the 12 months since the filing of the Notice of 
Default on December 31, 1987; that during the final twenty-four 
hour period before the sale, Sine could have found a person to 
bid in a cash amount of over $1,200,000 to purchase the Motel; or 
that Sine could have himself obtained financing to purchase the 
Motel himself. 
17. There is no evidence that Sine's action in not 
attending the sale during the last day before the sale harmed 
Sine any way. 
18. There is no evidence that Sine attempted to exer-
cise his rights of subrogation or Jerry Sine and Dora Sine's 
rights of redemption. 
19. Although it is not in the record, it is undisputed 
that Valley granted Jerry and Dora Sine rights of redemption, 
though it was not required to do so under trust deed foreclosure 
laws, and that the Sines did not exercise those rights. Valley 
has attempted, but has been unable to sell the Se Rancho Motel. 
Additionally, as of the date of filing this Brief, the Sines 
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continue in possession of the Se Rancho Motel through a rental 
agreement with Valley. 
20. In the Brief of Appellant it states that for the 
purpose of the appeal, Valley admits it agreed to do certain 
things. Sine mischaracterizes Valley's admission for the purpose 
of this appeal. Although Valley disagrees with the statements 
set forth in the Affidavits of Wesley Sine and David Cundick, for 
the purpose of this appeal only Valley admits the statements in 
the Affidavits to be true. Valley does not admit Sine's 
mischaracterization of the Affidavits as argued in his Brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Valley contends that the district court properly 
granted summary judgment in favor of Valley because there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and Valley is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Sine argues under a variety of theories that 
a statement made by Valley that it intended to bid the full bal-
ance due under the Note at the trustee's sale prevents Valley 
from obtaining judgment against Sine on the Guaranty. Valley's 
position is that regardless of how its statement is construed, as 
a statement or as an agreement, Valley is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. Valley's specific arguments are as follows: 
I. Valley's action is a simple action to enforce the 
Guaranty. On appeal, the existence and validity of the Guaranty 
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is undisputed as is the default of and the amount due under the 
Note executed by Jerry and Dora Sine. 
II. Because Sine executed an unconditional, absolute 
guaranty of payment, Utah Code Ann. S 57-1-32 (1988) does not 
apply. Strevell-Paterson Co., Inc. v. Francis, 646 P.2d 741 
(Utah 1982) provides authority for Valley proceeding directly 
against Sine as a guarantor to recover the balance due under the 
Note. 
III. Throughout his brief, Sine misrepresents the rul-
ing made by the Honorable Michael R. Murphy in his Summary Deci-
sion and the facts as they appear in the record. Sine repeatedly 
refers to the statement made by Valley that it intended to bid 
the full amount due under the Note at the trustee's sale as a 
"contract" or an "agreement." The Summary Decision does not make 
a finding of a contract or agreement. Valley's statement does 
not satisfy the elements necessary to prove .a contract or 
agreement. 
IV. Assuming, arguendo. Valley's statement constitutes 
an agreement and that agreement is characterized as an agreement 
to release Sine as a guarantor, that agreement is within the 
statute of frauds and must be in writing to be enforceable. 
V. If Valley's statement is construed as an agreement 
to do something other than release Sine as a guarantor, that 
agreement does not constitute a legal defense to Sine's Guaranty. 
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Relief for the breach of such an agreement includes traditional 
contract remedies and does not include the "nullification" of the 
Guarantee as argued by Sine. 
VI. Sine argues that if Valley's statement is con-
strued as an agreement to release Sine as a guarantor, that 
agreement need not be in writing because it was partially per-
formed by Sine. Because Sine did not timely raise the issue of 
part performance in the trial court, the court may not now con-
sider that issue on appeal. 
VII. Even if the doctrine of part performance were 
properly before the court, because the doctrine is available only 
in actions in equity, the doctrine cannot be applied to this case 
as this case is an action at law for damages. 
VIII. Assuming that the doctrine of part performance is 
available on appeal, the facts of this case do not satisfy the 
elements required to prove part performance. 
IX. The defense of promissory estoppel may not be 
properly considered by this court as it was not raised at the 
trial level. Sine is prevented from raising on appeal any matter 
which Sine failed to argue at the trial level. 
X. Even if the defense of promissory estoppel were 
properly before the court, the facts of this case do not satisfy 
the elements necessary to prove promissory estoppel. 
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ARGUMENT 
In reviewing a district court's ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment, the appellate court applies the same standard 
as was applied at the district level. Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 
934, 936 (Utah 1979). Accordingly, the appellate court must 
determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and 
whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Id. Because Sine has failed to demonstrate the existence 
of a genuine issue of material fact and because Valley is enti-
tled to judgment on Sine's Guaranty as a matter of law, the dis-
trict court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Valley should 
be upheld. 
The district court, as grounds for the decision, ruled 
that the alleged oral statement which Sine asserts to have been 
made by Valley to bid in the full amount of Jerry and Dora Sine's 
obligation at the trustee's sale, would have constituted a 
release from the Guaranty and as such was unenforceable because 
it was not in writing. Though the language of the Summary Deci-
sion is somewhat ambiguous, the district court did not make a 
specific finding that Valley's statement constituted an agree-
ment. The language of the Summary Decision suggests that the 
district court did not reach the issue of whether an agreement 
actually existed because, assuming that there was such an 
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agreement, Valley is still entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law because the alleged agreement was not in writing. Valley 
argues that to the extent the district court implied the exist-
ence of an oral agreement as the basis for its ruling, such an 
implication is unfounded and erroneous. 
It is well settled that a lower court's ruling should 
be affirmed if the correct result is reached even though a trial 
court may have assigned an incorrect reason for its ruling. 
Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980). Further-
more, the reviewing court will affirm a trial court's decision on 
any ground, even though that ground was not one relied upon by 
the trial court in its ruling, Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. 
Neeley Construction Co., 677 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Utah 1984), and 
even where that ground is argued for the first time on appeal. 
Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assoc, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). 
Regardless of whether Valley's statement is construed 
as an agreement or as a mere statement, Valley is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. If construed as an agreement to 
release Sine as a guarantor, the agreement is unenforceable 
because it was not in writing. If the agreement is construed as 
an agreement for something other than the release of Sine as a 
guarantor, such an agreement does not constitute a legal defense 
to Valley's action on the Guaranty and must be sued upon to 
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obtain any kind of relief. Finally, Sine argues that if the 
statement is construed as a mere statement, that statement equi-
tably estops Valley from obtaining judgment against Sine on the 
Guaranty. Sine is barred, however, from raising the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel for the first time on appeal. 
I. ON APPEAL, SINE DOES NOT CHALLENGE THE EXIST-
ENCE OR VALIDITY OF THE GUARANTY OR THE 
DEFAULT OF AND THE AMOUNT DUE UNDER THE NOTE. 
This case is an action to enforce the guarantee of pay-
ment executed by Sine, wherein Sine guaranteed the obligations 
owed by Jerry and Dora Sine to Valley. In connection with its 
motion for summary judgment, Valley proved the existence and 
validity of the Guaranty and the default of and the amount due 
under the Note owing by Jerry and Dora Sine to Valley. The 
uncontested affidavits of John R. Hanson and Richard Thomsen sub-
mitted by Valley in support of its motion for summary judgment 
establish that Jerry and Dora Sine were indebted to Valley pursu-
ant to the terms of the Note <R. 020-021); that Sine executed and 
delivered to Valley a guarantee of payment of the debts of his 
parents (R. 047-048); that the Note was in default (R. 021); and 
that demand was made upon Sine for the payment of the balance due 
and that Sine failed to make payment. (R. 021) Sine did not 
contest these facts in responding to Valley's motion. According 
to the terms of the Guaranty, Sine is personally liable to Valley 
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for the balance due under the Note and the trial court properly 
granted Valley's motion for summary judgment. 
II. THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANN. S 57-1-32, 
DO NOT APPLY TO AN ACTION TO ENFORCE AN 
UNCONDITIONAL GUARANTEE OF PAYMENT. 
Sine contends that the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
S 57-1-32 (1988) apply to proceedings to enforce unconditional 
guarantees of payment and that because Valley allegedly did not 
comply with those provisions, Valley is now precluded from 
obtaining judgment against Sine on his guarantee. Contrary to 
Sine's assertion, the provisions to S 57-1-32 do not apply to the 
facts of this case to an action to enforce an unconditional guar-
antee of payment. 
This action is not an action against the makers of the 
Note to obtain a deficiency judgment after the trustee's sale of 
the real property. This is an action against Sine to enforce his 
individual, unconditional guarantee of payment. Sine is not a 
party to the Note or to the Trust Deed. Sine is a guarantor. He 
did not pledge security for Jerry and Dora Sine's obligations to 
Valley. His guarantee is security for those obligations. 
In seeking to recover from Sine as a guarantor, Valley 
proceeded in accordance with the clear pronouncement of the Utah 
Supreme Court in Strevell-Paterson Co., Inc. v. Francis, 646 P.2d 
741 (Utah 1982), relating to the liability of a guarantor to the 
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obligee. In Strevell, the court drew a distinction between guar-
antees of collection and guarantees of payment. Where a guaranty 
is a guarantee of collection, the guaranty is conditional and the 
guarantor's liability is dependent on the creditor's first 
exhausting its remedies against the primary obligor and against 
any collateral. Strevell, 646 P.2d at 743. 
Guarantees of payment, on the other hand, uncondition-
ally guarantee payment so that the creditor has no duty to pursue 
the primary obligor or the security as a precondition to pursuing 
the guarantor. Id. Whether a guaranty is a guarantee of col-
lection or a guarantee of payment depends on the nature of the 
guarantor's promise as evidenced by the provisions of the partic-
ular guaranty, id. 
In Strevell, the court found that the guaranty involved 
in that case was an absolute guarantee of payment for the reason 
that 
it contains no express or implied condition 
on liability and no contractual requirement 
that the creditor seeks satisfaction else-
where before commencing action on the 
guarantee. 
Id. at 744. Similar to the guaranty involved in Strevell, Sine's 
Guaranty provides that Sine agrees to 
guarantee payment when due of any and all 
obligations of [Jerry and Dora Sine] to Bank 
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(R. 024) Sine's Guaranty contains no preconditions to Sine's 
liability. The Guaranty is clearly an absolute guarantee of 
payment. As such, Strevell authorized Valley to proceed directly 
against Sine without pursuing its remedies against Jerry and Dora 
Sine and without first having foreclosed its interest in the 
Motel. Accordingly, Valley commenced its action against Sine as 
the guarantor prior to foreclosing its interest in the real 
property. Section 51-1-32 does not apply to Valley's action 
against Sine and Valley is entitled to judgment against Sine as a 
matter of law. 
III. THE AFFIDAVITS OF SINE AND DAVID CUNDICK DO 
NOT ESTABLISH AN AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY 
VALLEY AND SINE. 
In his Brief of Appellant, Sine repeatedly refers to 
the statement made by Valley that it would bid the full amount of 
the obligation as a "contract," an "agreement," an "oral agree-
ment" and a "promise." Sine's characterization of Valley's 
statement as an agreement or contract misrepresents and finds no 
support in the record. The only statement made in Sine's affida-
vit relating to Valley's statement is as follows: 
After considerable discussion, Mr. Doctorman, 
in the presence of Mr. Zollinger, and with 
his acquiescence, stated that I need not 
worry that Valley Bank would bid on the 
property at the amount owed on the Note plus 
interest, costs and attorney's fees. 
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(R. 057). The only reference in the affidavit of David C. 
Cundick ("Cundick") to Valley's statement is as follows: 
Towards the end of the meeting and in 
response to concerns raised by Mr. Sine, Mr. 
Doctorman represented that at the sheriff's 
[sic, it was a trustee's sale] sale (which 
was to be held and was held on the following 
day) Valley Bank would bid on the property at 
the amount owed, plus interest, plus attor-
neys fees, 
(R. 059) There is absolutely no reference in either of the 
affidavits that Valley and Sine entered into an agreement which 
bound Valley to bid in the full amount of the debt and which 
required Sine to not appear at the trustee's sale. 
When Valley's statement is viewed in context, it is 
apparent that it was not made in connection with a discussion 
relating to Sine's liability under his guarantee. Rather, it was 
made in connection with Sine's concern that Jerry and Dora Sine's 
right to redeem the Motel after the trustee's sale would be 
extinguished if Valley did not buy the property. (R. 057) Sine 
states in his affidavit that he was: 
concerned that some party other than Valley 
Bank, would purchase the property at the 
trustee's sale, thereby denying Jerry and 
Dora Sine of their previously agreed-upon 
redemption rights. 
(R. 057) Valley did in fact purchase the property at the sale 
(R.021) and as a result Jerry and Dora Sine retained their 
redemption rights to the property. 
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Contrary to Sine's assertion, Valley's statement does 
not constitute a contract because it does not satisfy the ele-
ments needed to prove a contract. To establish the existence of 
a contract, albeit oral, there must be an offer, acceptance and 
valuable consideration. Hall v. Add-Ventures, Ltd., 695 P.2d 
1081, 1087 (Alaska 1985). In the instant case, none of these 
essential elements are present. 
There is nothing in the affidavits indicating that 
Valley or Sine made an offer or an acceptance. Furthermore, the 
affidavits of Sine and Cundick do not show that Sine gave any 
kind of valuable consideration for Valley's alleged promise. 
Consideration is defined as an act or a promise, 
bargained for and given in exchange for another act or promise. 
Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc., 
706 P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985). The type of promise which 
qualifies as consideration must contemplate a benefit to the 
promisor or a detriment to the promisee, id. Regardless of how 
articulated, Sine did not make a promise to Valley which resulted 
in a detriment to Sine or a benefit to Valley. 
Sine represents in his Brief of Appellant that the 
affidavits of Cundick and Sine demonstrate that the parties 
agreed that Sine would not attend or cause others to attend or 
bid at the trustees sale of the motel." Brief of Appellant, p. 
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1. Sine misrepresents the facts as stated in the affidavits. 
There is no evidence in the record that at the time of Valley's 
alleged statement, Sine in fact "agreed11 to not attend the sale 
or to obtain bidders for the property. In his affidavit, Sine 
merely states that "I told them that I probably would not and did 
not attend the trustees sale." (Emphasis added.) (R.058) 
Sine's statement that he probably would not attend is not a 
promise. Rather, it is a mere statement of likelihood or of 
intention. Cundick's affidavit makes absolutely no reference to 
whether Sine stated that he would or would not attend the sale. 
(R.059-060) 
Sine fails to show how his inaction was in any way 
valuable to Valley. Sine also fails to show how his failure to 
attend the trustee's sale or to locate a buyer during the one day 
period between Valley's statement and the trustee's sale caused 
Sine a determent. There is no evidence in the record that Sine 
had, at any time during the twelve months after the filing of the 
Notice of Default, sought bidders for the Motel. There is 
nothing in the record to show that Sine had the financial ability 
or desire to bid at the sale himself. There is also no evidence 
in the record that Sine could have found during the last 24 hours 
before the sale, a buyer to bid in cash to purchase the Motel. 
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IV. ASSUMING VALLEY'S
 S T A T E M E N T C Q N S T I T U T E D j^ 
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THAT AGREEMENT MUST BE IN WRITING TO BE 
ENFORCEABLE. 
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Jui 1« ' 1 ifi I HOI, 7 Muniiiii • encompassed wi t h i n I r !' he mi inn f, a id b a l a n c e due 
u n d e r i.liw ecu l i u i luJy \U, r'UJ6 Commercial l Jroiiu^sor> Nui: TI e 
r e c o r d does p\o^ e v i d e n c e ar y o t n e n a t i o n s owing 5* "er ~y and 
E j : ; : s h S i n e ' - ^  ' . 
c u i s h * i * * . l i g a t i o n s S i n e * < • 1-- * ^ e a r a r t y 
c 
Str
 /z Inc . v . a/.w . o , , 7 
(-Tt-^v - - - a - H^<; *- *• ^- aoT-^^p - - - . e a s e i i a *antor 
n 
The release or revocation of an agreement to 
answer for the debt of another must also be 
in writing. It is well settled that if an 
original agreement is within the Statute of 
Frauds, any subsequent agreement which alters 
or amends it must also satisfy the require-
ment of the Statute. 
Strevell, 646 P.2d at 742. Because Valley's alleged agreement 
was in effect an agreement to release Sine from his Guaranty, it 
falls within the Statute of Frauds and is therefore unenforceable 
because it is not in writing. 
V. BECAUSE SINE DID NOT TIMELY RAISE THE ISSUE 
OF PART PERFORMANCE IN THE TRIAL COURT, SINE 
IS NOT ENTITLED TO RELY ON THE DOCTRINE ON 
APPEAL. 
Sine contends that if Valley's statement is construed 
as an agreement to release Sine as a guarantor, that agreement 
need not be in writing because it was partially performed. Sine 
asserts that his failure to attend the sale constitutes part 
performance. 
It is well established that an appellate court cannot 
consider as grounds for an appeal issues which were not raised at 
the trial level. Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development 
Co. , 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983). Sine failed to timely 
raise the doctrine of part performance in the trial court. Sine 
did not mention the doctrine in his Answer or in his Response to 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 051) Sine did, however, raise 
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f i n a l judgment aga ins t ; S i n e , (R. IIM I „ 095-01:» 6 ) 
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p r o v i d e s 1: ha I ii| in ,i m o t i o n t o r new 1 r i a l w h e r e t h e a c t i o n h a s 
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tin els i * Il  I in IIII n mi II mi in i n II i ) II <l I mi 1 II '" ""ii"! ill I I > II <„, I in I > 
file. However there was not a trial. The case was decided by 
motion. 
Because Sine did not raise the doctrine of part perfor-
mance until the court had entered judgment, that doctrine may not 
be considered on appeal. Franklin Financial v. New Empire Devel-
opment Co., 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983) involved facts similar to 
those involved in this case. In Franklin, the plaintiff Franklin 
Financial ("Franklin"), commenced an action to foreclose a con-
tract of sale on an apartment building and to recover amounts due 
under the contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Franklin. 
On appeal, the defendant-lienholders argued that sum-
mary judgment in favor of Franklin was precluded as a matter of 
law because certain amendments to the contract of sale consti-
tuted new agreements which had priority as of the date they were 
executed. The Utah Supreme Court rejected the lienholders' argu-
ments as having been presented too late. The court noted that 
the lienholders raised their argument for the first time in their 
Objection to the Summary Judgment and Order of Sale filed after 
the judgment had been entered by the trial court. Noting that 
the lienholders had failed to argue the creation of the new con-
tracts to the trial court prior to the courtfs ruling on the 
motion for summary judgment, the court refused to consider the 
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lienholder's arguments raised on appeal 1d, at 1045. According 
t I In 'in i l 
Generally, issues raised for the first time 
in post-judgment motions are raised too late 
to be reviewed on appeal, 
I d . S e e a l s o Liiiiiiiuqhaiii » » m i n i Ingham hill II1 ' I ' 11 MM iili I Hi I i 
(refusing to consider on appeal an issue mil raised at the ii ial 
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appeal . 
V*. x, *ALLEY'S "AGREEMENT" WERE AN AGREEMENT TO 
DO SOMETHING OTHER THAN RELEASE SINE AS A 
GUARANTOR, THAT AGREEMENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE 
A DEFENSE TO THE GUARANTY, BUT WOULD ONLY 
GIVE RISE TO AN ACTION BY SINE TO ENFORCE THE 
ALLEGED AGREEMENT. 
Sine attempts to characterize Valley1s oral statement 
t i n ill I I mi I i I  I i mi i I  I Ii I! in in I I  a m o mi nl ' d i n e u n d e r t h e N o t e a t t h e 
t r u s t e e s s a l e a s burnetii t ncj otJhei t h a n an a q r e e m e n t l: r e l e a s e 
S i n e a s a g u a r a n t o r , He d o e s t i n s t o a v o i d t h e e f f e c t of t h e 
s I lit ul M i I I ii'ii in Ills ill 1 III in i 11 in 1 i e 1 •. I III ill nil 1 "I in il he e n f o r c e a b l e , 
the release ol a quatantui must be in s i t i n g 'II i 'ell-Paterson 
Co., Inc. v, Francis, b 4 b P • 2d 7 -II ) 4 J «!' U t; a h 1982 I Il II how -
e v e n : , «n-i II I i
 i II n I i i i i inii I i« » h u i a i t en ; i -• ••• > 1 n • "in " a r i r e e i i i e i ' i I I i o 
something other than release Sine fruin I,he guarantee, I hat. agree-
m e n t is nut n defeii i I I hn> Guaranty, Provider"! |-1 il •  ,irh an 
a g r e e m e n t i e n i JH I e a t u l t 1 nr, ii IIIIII ill1 I i I" h i i ill ii'i ' i i i n p l 1 ' a 
separate agreement. To enforce that agreement, Sine would have 
to commence an independent action. Relief for the breach of an 
oral agreement includes traditional contract remedies, such as 
damages or specific performance. The remedies for the breach of 
a contract do not include the recision of other independent con-
tracts. Sine argues, however, that the alleged agreement somehow 
"nullifies11 the Guaranty. Sine fails to provide the court with 
any authority whatsoever for his theory. Respondent is not aware 
of such authority. Sine has not commenced an action based on 
Valley's alleged independent "agreement." Even if Sine were to 
have commenced such an action, the "nullification" of one con-
tract is not a remedy for the breach of another contract. 
VII. EVEN IP THE COURT WERE TO CONSIDER THE DOC-
TRINE OF PART-PERFORMANCE ON APPEAL, BECAUSE 
THE DOCTRINE OF PART-PERFORMANCE IS AVAILABLE 
ONLY IN ACTIONS IN EQUITY, IT IS NOT AVAIL-
ABLE TO SINE IN THIS CASE. 
It is well established in Utah law that the doctrine of 
part performance is purely equitable in nature and is therefore 
unavailable in an action at law for damages. McKinnon v. Corp. 
of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 529 
P.2d 434 (Utah 1974); Bauqh v. Logan City, 495 P.2d 814 (Utah 
1972); Bauqh v. Parley, 184 P.2d 335 (Utah 1947). In the instant 
case, Valley's action is an action at law. Valley's complaint 
consists of one cause of action and only requests money damages 
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to Valley or in the form of a detriment to Sine. Additionally, 
Sine's alleged act of part performance was not substantial enough 
to take the case outside of the statute of frauds. Finally, 
Sine's failure to attend the trustee's sale was not exclusively 
referable to Valley's statement. Sine states in his affidavit 
only that he probably would not attend the trustee's sale. 
(R. 058) 
IX. BECAUSE SINE FAILED TO PROPERLY PRESENT THE 
DEFENSE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL TO THE TRIAL 
COURT, HE IS NOW BARRED FROM RAISING THAT 
DEFENSE IN THIS APPEAL. 
In points 6 and 8 of the Brief of the Appellant, Sine 
argues that the doctrine of promissory estoppel prevents Valley 
from pursuing Sine as a guarantor. Sine failed to raise the 
defense of promissory estoppel in his Response to Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment. (R.051-056) However, the Second Defense con-
tained in Sine's Answer states as follows: 
Plaintiff has by its act and/or omissions may 
have waived its claim against defendant 
and/or by reason thereof plaintiff may be 
estopped to assert said claim and/or may have 
released defendant from his obligation to 
plaintiff. 
Despite the generic reference in Sine's Answer to estoppel as a 
defense, he is now precluded from raising that defense on appeal 
because he failed to submit evidence or legal authority support-
ing the defense at the trial level. 
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which were not submitted to the trial court 
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fart or law* 
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X. EVEN IF THE COURT WERE TO CONSIDER THE 
DEFENSE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL, BECAUSE THE 
FACTS OF THIS CASE DO NOT SATISFY THE ELE-
MENTS OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL, THAT THEORY 
DOES NOT PRESENT A DEFENSE TO VALLEYfS 
ACTION. 
In his brief, Sine argues that Valley is estopped from 
obtaining a judgment against Sine because of Valley's alleged 
statement that it intended to bid in the full amount of the bal-
ance due under the Note. Because the facts of this case do not 
satisfy the elements required to establish promissory estoppel, 
Valley remains entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
The doctrine of promissory estoppel applies where (1) a 
promise is made; (2) which can reasonably be expected to induce 
action or forbearance; (3) which promise in fact induces action 
or forbearance; (4) from which detriment is suffered. Topik v. 
Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Utah 1987). Initially, and as 
argued throughout this brief, Valley did not promise to bid in 
the full amount of the debt. Furthermore, the record does not 
establish that Valley's statement of intention that it would bid 
the full amount of the obligation in fact induced Sine to not 
attend the sale. As stated above, Sine represented in his affi-
davit that he "probably would not" attend the sale. (Emphasis 
added.) (R. 057) Finally, Sine did not suffer a detriment as a 
result of his failure to attend the sale or to seek bidders dur-
ing the final 24 hour period before the sale. Jerry and Dora 
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Sine In fact received their redemption riqhts which was Sine's 
stated concern. (li.U':i ) There is nn evidence in I he record 
t h a i i J I . I i in m; j I L l i e I! •' in in I III | e i, 11 i d i i I I i i I lllii II m II i IIIIIM | I I II I l i i I II l i i 11 
D e f a u l t on December 3 1 r 1 3 8 8 , t h a t S i n e s o u g h t purchaser ! : ! hni I he 
Nn h-" I ; mi Ih it d ui" inn t ho f i n a l In in n e r i o d b e f o r e t h e s d h 1 S i n e 
c o u l d h a v e l o u n d | ,li ' l . d ' " IJ j s h ' « p u r c h a s e ' • IJ 
M o t e l ; o r t h a t S i n e had ll n a n c J a I r r ^ i u r e^ h i p u r c h a s e t h e 
il" 1 i i " mi i i i I I I > ' j i ill , i I I mi in 111') - i in iiiiiii i i i" in i i i H i n i II1 mi t n ill in in ll i h i l 
mi in in I • d i d not. a p p e a l a t t h e Bdla audi d i d mi l a e u k b i d d e r s Jun i n g 
till ill I is I d a y b e f o r e t h e s a l e , d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t h i s i n a c t i o n d i d 
mi 11 i enu I I i (ii imi i in I IIIIIII III1 i" i in il inn 11 i i" 1 i ni I i IIIIIII M i I I i il i I i 
m e n t a n d h a v i n g s u f f e r e d no d a m a g e In IIIIIII I 11 ,s i n a c t i o n , line d o c -
t r i n e id p r o m i s s o r y e s t o p p e l d u e s nol a iml miuJ V a l l e y i s e n t i -
t l e d I.J j u d g m e n t a g a i n s 1 hi .c a s a w d M » l l iw. 
CQNCLUSIQM 
S i n e f s a p p r o a c h In a r q u i i n j ti bevy of I n q a l t h e o r i e s a n d 
d e f e n s e s IIII in I Ii i Ii M I } m 1 iiiisi?d a t Liie t r i a l levnl inn 
fuses a simple u ^ , SI . IL I% J guaran tor under an nincoid.1 ./ J ! 
g u a r a n t e e of payment, P u l l e y ' s s ta tement t h a i IL intended Lo bid 
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S i n e ' s o b l i g a t i o n In Valley, Hegard 1 ess i>f; 11ow Va 1.1ey s s t a t e -
ment is c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a s t a t emen t , as an agreement to r e l e a s e 
S I inn1 as i jiini i unit n i 11 ir i in i I T II«.] r1 M# y i HUH i in1-
in all cases, entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Valley 
respectfully requests that this court affirm the district court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Valley and grant Valley 
costs and attorneys1 fees as provided in the Guaranty. 
DATED this / {Q day of February, 1990. 
Ich^O*^^ 
ELIZABETH Sf. WHITNEY 
of aSad-^ for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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prepaid, four true and correct copies of I he foregoing BK1 hif-' uF 
RESPONDENT to the following on this /if day oi Februdij, 1JJU: 
Ronald C. Barker 
Mitchell R. Barker 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
^CARYET 
of and f( 
PARSONS, BEpLE & LATIMER 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPAN 
a Utah corporation 
Plaint i f f, 
vs. 
WESLEY Sir * 
Defendant,. 
SUMMARY DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-88-7 9 62 
PL d i 111 i If III 1 mil H i 1.1 I h a s u m m a r v . .ume defendant 
opposes the motion on three grounds 
partnersh i p debt s < in 1 y • ( ,") |»1 • i I 111 \ 
Set'" ; .
 M " 1 i. , ' 1, ..Ji. Anil, , .a. 
a c l in il i mi ih f i c i e n c y "judgment - ^ 
p r o c e e d i n g a q a i n s t dcfendai 1| '"" 
t h e s p e c i f i e d grounds in o p p o s i t i o n ux 
(1) i i ider ly ing d e b t s a r e t h o s e 
Ttini f in 1 I III i ! i n l I I n i I  
w...: i\. 1111 tsi'Ly Sine InvetaLjuri, 
cartnersh :i dent; Corresr^rd i T I ) v 
letendant J i^- < ~.*-eed 
aiiil,i; or a 1
 h ,v i. ved 
estip '-,i *• ~~ni 
-ixOWS. 
"err; Si r ^  ^! h * * 
• r e ) re^erer.^e 
that _i 
: partnership - guaranteed debt *\±s 
.uudls J e n y and ~ura Sine. 
ADDENDA "A" 
VALLEY BANK V. SINE PAGE TWO SUMMARY DECISION 
(2) Plaintiff's failure to adhere to Section 57-1-32, Utah 
Code Ann., is not pertinent to a proceeding, such as this, 
against a guarantor of a secured debt. 
(3) Defendant's assertion of an oral agreement that 
plaintiff would bid the property at a level that would avoid a 
deficiency is presented in the Second Defense of the Answer as a 
waiver and/or estoppel and/or release. Additionally, the Third 
Defense alleges accord and satisfaction, novation, laches, and 
election of remedies along with a litany of eleven other defenses 
lfand/or possibly other affirmative defenses." Notwithstanding 
this plethora of legal theories by which defendant seeks to avoid 
his guaranty, the court must analyze the defendant's theory as it 
is presented in his opposition to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Defendant asserts that the statements concerning 
plaintiff's intent to bid the full amount owed plus interest, 
costs and attorney fees constituted an agreement. (Defendant's 
Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 2-3 and 
5) . Furthermore, defendant testified that the alleged oral 
agreement was the basis of his defense. (Supplemental Affidavit 
of Wesley Sine, para. 2). 
Such an oral agreement would negate the consequences of the 
guaranty and, regardless of the characterization of the legal 
theory, work a release from or an amendment or revocation of the 
guaranty. As such, this oral agreement comes within the Statute 
VALLEY BANK V. SINE PAGE THREE SUMMARY DECISION 
of Frauds. Strevell-Patterson Co. v. Francis, 646 P.2d 741 (Utah 
1982) . While there is consideration for the oral agreement in 
the form of defendant's purported failure to attend or encourage 
others to attend the trustee's sale, there is no writing signed 
by the party to be charged. The alleged oral agreement, then, 
fails to comply with the Statute of Frauds and is voidable. 
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted. There has been no objection to the request 
for fees or the affidavit establishing their reasonableness. 
Plaintiff shall prepare a form of judgment and submit the same 
pursuant to Rule 4-504, Code of Judicial Administration. 
Dated this _day of March, 1989. 
/-SL 
/ MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
VALLEY BANK V. SINE PAGE FOUR SUMMARY DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Summary Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this <$? Y day of March, 1989: 
Gary Doctorman 
Elizabeth S, Whitney 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 W. Broadway, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Ronald C. Barker 
Attorney for Defendant 
2870 S. State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake) 
If Wesley F. Sine, being first duly sworn on oath deposes and 
says as follows: 
1. On the 28th day of December, 1988 I attended a meeting 
with M. Craig Zollinger, Assistant Vice President of the 
Supervised Loan Department for Valley Bank and Trust Company, at 
his office located at 80 West Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Also present at the meeting were my attorney David C. Cundick and 
Gary E. Doctorman, legal counsel for Valley Bank. 
2. Purpose of the meeting was to discuss possible extension 
of a Sheriff fs sale of the Se Rancho Motel property which was 
scheduled to take place the following day. The property is 
owned by my parents Jerry & Dora Sine. I am the General Manager of 
Se Rancho Motel and manage that property for them. 
I was concerned that some party other than Valley Bank, 
would purchase the property at the trustee's sale, thereby 
denying Jerry and Dora Sine of their previously agreed upon 
redemption rights* 
3. After considerable discussion, Mr. Doctorman, in the 
presence of Mr. Zollinger, and with his acquiescence, stated that 
I need not worry that Valley Bank would bid on the property at 
the amount owed on the note plus interest, costs and attorney's 
fees. 
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EXHIBIT "I" 
4. I was asked if I planned to attend the sale. Relying 
upon this assurance from Mr. Doctorman and Mr. Zollinger I told 
them that I probably would not and did not attend the trustee's 
sale. We then shook hands and Mr. Cundick & myself left the 
meeting. 
Dated the / /'^ Day of February, 1989. 
A 
1989. 
Wesley F. Sine 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / day of February, 
^/gj^hkU rfaAJs^t^lJ 
iary Public ^ ^ i d i n g at Sal t 
Lake City, Utal 
My commission expi res : (^/fr^yy/^ /$~f/99/ 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, David C. Cundick, being first duly sworn on oath deposes 
as says as follows: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of 
Utah. 
2. On the 28th day of December, 1988 I attended a meeting at 
the request of Mr. Wesley Sine with representatives of Valley 
Bank and as such I have personal knowledge of statements made by 
people in attendance at that meeting. 
3. The meeting was held in early afternoon. Those who were 
in attendance include myself, Mr. Wesley Sine, Mr. Craig 
Zollinger (represented to be a vice-president of the supervised 
loan department) and Mr. Gary Doctorman (represented to be 
attorney for Valley Bank). 
4. The meeting lasted approximately one-half hour. The 
purpose of the meeting was to discuss the possibility of 
postponing a pending sheriff's sale of certain property that Mr. 
Sine holds an interest in. 
5. Towards the end of the meeting and in response to 
concerns raised by Mr. Sine, Mr. Doctorman represented that at 
the sheriff's sale (which was to be held and was held on the 
following day) Valley Bank would bid on the property at the 
amount owed, plus interest, plus attorneys fees. 
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ADDENDA "C" 
QQQQSi 
6. At no time during the meeting did Mr. Zollinger dispute 
the statements made by Mr. Doctorman concerning the price at 
which Valley Bank would bid. 
Further affiant saith naught. 
DATED this 7th day of February, 1989. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 7th day of February, 
1989. 
)TARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
My commission expires: Ccu4M<**& /^, /?*?/ 
%<&*?zcK*$t> 'WaAZZ4*&c4/ 
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